


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PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

BY

COLONEL DONALD G. GOFF
United States Army



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OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

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May 1992

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OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

I. INTRODUCTION

WHY OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT?

In early 1991, as OPERATION DESERT STORM ended, the world press reported that nearly 2,000 Kurdish men, women and children were dying each day in the harsh cold of the Turkish-Iraqi mountains. Scenes of bare feet and poorly clothed Kurkish women and children showed them walking in snow and frigid temperatures to escape Saddam Hussein's vengeance as he crushed their short-lived Kurdish nationalist uprising.¹ Kurdish leaders reported three million Kurds had fled into the 8,000-foot mountains.² World opinion and public concern for the plight of the Kurdish people forced democratic nations to build a military coalition to provide humanitarian assistance to ease the suffering of the Kurds. The code name for this humanitarian operation was OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC).

On 5 April 1991, President Bush ordered the United States military to begin airlifting food and medical supplies to the Kurdish refugees trapped in the mountains along the Iraq-Turkey border.³ American military cargo aircraft flying from Europe and escorted by jet fighters began dropping food, blankets, tents and

medical supplies to the Kurds along the 206-mile border area on 7 April 1991.⁴ During April and May 1991, over 40,000 soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen deployed from thirteen countries to support OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. Besides food, water, medical care, shelter and clothing, these coalition forces provided the Kurds a safe area in northern Iraq that allowed them to return to their homes in peace. In turn, the military coalition handed the humanitarian mission over to the United Nations and civilian relief organizations.

This paper will relate my personal experience as the J3 of Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) deployed to northern Iraq in support of OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. The political-military setting and chronology of how the Kurds ended up in the cold, harsh mountains of eastern Turkey is presented as a frame of reference why the United States participated in OPC. The evolution of the command structure for OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT is also presented to lay the ground work for the establishment of Joint Task Force Bravo. JTF-B had the mission to provide humanitarian support to the Kurds and conduct defensive combat operations against Iraqi forces while deployed into northern Iraq.

HOW THE KURDS ENDED UP IN THE MOUNTAINS

Soon after the DESERT STORM victory, based on misreading U.S. intentions, the Iraqi Kurds took the initiative and began to eliminate Iraqi control over the northern provinces. President Bush's press statements at the time gave hope to both the Kurds in

the north and Shiite Muslims in the south of Iraq that they had the support of the United States.⁵ The Kurds interpreted this support to be American military muscle to help overthrow Saddam Hussein, while President Bush intended only to offer moral support. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) clandestine radio station in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, made announcements that also gave encouragement that the United States would support their overthrow of Saddam Hussein.⁶ On 5 March 1991, Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), committed Kurdish guerrilla




Figure 1

fighters against the Iraqis. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also committed guerrilla fighters against the Iraqi military. The Kurds attacked Iraqi forces and defeated scattered garrisons throughout northern Iraq.⁷ On 14

March 1991, Jalal Talabani, leader of the PUK, announced that Kurdish groups controlled the Dihok, Mosul, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya provinces in northern Iraq.⁸ President Bush warned the Iraqi government not to use attack helicopters against rebel forces because this would complicate efforts for a permanent cease-fire negotiated after

DESERT STORM.⁹

Saddam Hussein's speech of 16 March 1991 said that Iraqi armed forces would crush Kurdish forces with the use of attack helicopters, airplanes and chemical weapons.¹⁰ The United States government response came ten days later, during a White House press conference on 26 March 1991, when Bush administration officials strongly reaffirmed U.S. neutrality in the battles raging in Iraq. American military force would not be used to protect civilian and armed rebel groups seeking to topple the government of Saddam Hussein. "We don't intend to involve ourselves in the internal conflicts in Iraq," said Marlin Fitzwater, the President's spokesman.¹¹ This signaled that the United States had no intention to intervene in the struggle. Saddam Hussein, based on this signal, started his offensive against the Kurds. A State Department representative admitted on 29 March 1991 that the Baghdad government had started a major assault against Kurdish held regions.¹² Reorganized Iraqi Republican Guard units moved into northern Iraq to attack the Kurds.¹³

The KUP leader, Jalal Talabani, appealed to President Bush and the United Nations to stop the annihilation of the Kurdish people by Iraqi military forces.¹⁴ On 1 April 1991, Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), reported that three million Kurds had fled into the northern mountains with little food and inadequate shelter. Barzani requested the United States, United Kingdom, and France to send aid to the people. He also requested that these three countries also stop the genocide against the

Kurds. He reported that 1,000-1,500 Kurds were dying each day from disease, cold and hunger in the mountain camps. On this day, Radio Baghdad reported to have recaptured the towns of Dihok, Irbil, Kirkuk and Zakho.¹⁵ On 2 April 1991, Turkey and France asked the United Nations Security Council to condemn Saddam Hussein for the repression of the Kurds.

Iraqi senior officials announced on 5 April 1991 that they had crushed the Kurdish rebellion and regained control of northern Iraq.¹⁶ Lionel A. Rosenblatt, President of Refugees International, said that the world faced the greatest challenge in the history of refugee relief. There were no comprehensive figures on deaths, but relief officials estimated that 1,000 people were dying daily. Relief officials expected the daily death rate to double or triple if the needed humanitarian assistance was not provided.¹⁷ The same day, President Bush ordered the American military forces to begin airlift of food and medicines. The first airdrop was food stuffs on 7 April 1991. The United States would provide ten million dollars for the humanitarian aid.¹⁸

On 8 April 1991, European leaders agreed to provide \$180 million worth of economic aid to the Kurds. Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom proposed to secure a Kurdish safe haven area in northern Iraq by using United Nation troops. Major also said that the West should be prepared to support a UN presence as long as necessary to secure proper treatment for the Kurds.¹⁹

Department of Defense Secretary Cheney supported the establishment of a safe haven for Kurds in northern Iraq proposed

by Mr. Majors. Iraq had expressed fierce opposition to Mr. Majors' proposal. On 10 April 1991, the Bush administration backed away from the proposal of establishing safe havens in Iraq to protect the fleeing refugees. Administrative officials had told the Iraqi government to avoid military operations in the air north of the Thirty-sixth Parallel.²⁰

After a meeting with European leaders on 12 April 1991, President Bush agreed to the creation of a safe zone in Iraq where Kurdish refugees would be protected. He also ordered a massive helicopter airlift organized to speed the humanitarian relief efforts to the Kurds.

II. COMMAND STRUCTURE EVOLUTION

JOINT TASK FORCE-PROVIDE COMFORT

On 5 April 1991, President Bush announced the United States military would provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering Kurds. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff selected the United States European Command (EUCOM) to execute the mission. EUCOM immediately formed Joint Task Force-PROVIDE COMFORT (JTF-PC) and ordered the JTF to deploy to Incirlek Air Base, Turkey, to provide humanitarian support to the Kurdish refugees. EUCOM selected Air Force Major General James L. Jamerson as the commander of JTF-PC. General Jamerson was serving as the Deputy Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe. Initially, EUCOM envisioned only American military forces would provide help to the Kurds. Therefore, only a joint task force was formed versus

a combined task force.

The JTF-PC was established at the U.S. Air Base in Incirlek, Turkey, on 6 April 1991. The initial components of JTF-PC were air forces (AFFOR) and special operations forces (SOF). Both component headquarters deployed to Incirlek Air Base on 6 April 1991 and co-located with JTF-PC headquarters. AFFOR was under the command of Air Force Brigadier General James L. Hobson, Jr. The SOF forces were under the command of Army Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, Jr.

The initial mission of JTF-PC was to provide humanitarian relief of food and other necessities by airdrop to the Kurds in the

| <u>KURD MOUNTAIN CAMPS</u> | |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| <u>CAMPS</u> | <u># KURDS</u> |
| Cukurca | 115,000 |
| Isikerven | 80,000 |
| Kayadibi | 12,000 |
| New Haj | 20,000 |
| Pirinceken | 12,000 |
| Schendili | 10,000 |
| Sinat | 6,000 |
| Uzumla | 60,000 |
| Yekmal | 71,000 |
| Yesilova | 6,000 |
| Unnamed Camps | <u>60,000</u> |
| TOTAL | 452,000 |

Figure 2

mountains. JTF-PC air forces (AFFOR) consisting of C-130's and fighter escort aircraft conducted the first airdrops of twenty-seven tons of supplies to the Kurds located in the mountains on 7 April 1991.²¹ Fighter aircraft escorted the airdrops to ensure Iraqi military forces would not interfere with their delivery. The

headquarters and air elements of AFFOR were stationed at Incirlek Air Base.

Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) under the command of General Potter provided the SOF forces for JTF-PC. The SOF forces were initially called Joint Task Force-Express Care and later changed to Joint Task Force-Alpha (JTF-A). JTF-A consisted

of the Army's 10th Special Forces Group (10 SFG) and the Air Force's 39th Special Operations Wing (39 SOW). The 39 SOW deployed its aircraft and personnel to three airfields located in Eastern Turkey--Incirlek Air Base, Batman Air Base and Diyarbakir Air Base. The 39 SOW flew air drop and helicopter resupply missions to drop zones and landing zones in the Kurdish mountain camps. The 10 SFG deployed company sized units into the make-shift camps of the




Figure 3

Kurds. On 9 April, the SOF mission expanded to include supervision of airdrops. This stopped the Kurdish refugees from being injured while rushing onto the drop zones toward the parachuted supplies. The SOF forces were to organize the eight major camps and forty-three

separate locations isolated in the 8,000-foot mountains along the 206-mile Turkish-Iraqi border.²² The SOF area of operations straddled the entire length of the Turkish-Iraqi border. The area included fifteen kilometers inside Iraq and fifteen kilometers inside Turkey.

The third component joining JTF-PC on 10 April 1991 was naval forces (NAVFOR). The Carrier Battle Group Teddy Roosevelt (TF 60), located in the Mediterranean Sea, formed the NAVFOR. TF 60 was to enforce the President's 10 April 1991 warning to Iraq not to fly any Iraqi aircraft or helicopters north of the Thirty-sixth

Parallel. NAVFOR under the command of Navy Rear Admiral Robert J. Spane, provided combat air patrol (CAP) north of the Thirty-sixth Parallel beginning on 11 April 1991.

The enormous task of providing helicopter airlift for humanitarian supplies exceeded the 39 SOW capability. The Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group, with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24 MEU) and its helicopter squadron with 4 CH-53s and 12 CH-46s, reported to General Potter on 13 April 1991.²³ These helicopters went into immediate service supporting the airlift.

On 12 April 1991, President Bush agreed with European leaders on a six-point coalition humanitarian program for the Kurds: (1) Assist the survival of the Kurdish displaced civilians. (2) Provide protection and shelter to the Kurds. (3) Establish a "Safe Haven" inside Iraq. (4) Assimilate the Kurds back into their home areas. (5) Transfer relief operations to civilian agencies. (6) Withdraw coalition military forces.²⁴ After the 12 April European leaders' meeting, many nations were notifying both the United Nations and the American government that they were going to participate in the relief operations for the Kurds in support of the six-point program. The first multinational forces began to arrive 13-14 April 1991 and the last on 1 May 1991. The participation in the humanitarian relief operations and establishment of a safe haven by other nations formed COMBINED TASK FORCE-PROVIDE COMFORT.

COMBINED TASK FORCE-PROVIDE COMFORT

The formation of COMBINED TASK FORCE-PROVIDE COMFORT (CTF-PC) occurred on 16 April 1991 with the arrival of multinational forces.

| <u>MILITARY COALITION MEMBERS</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| AUSTRALIA | BELGIUM |
| CANADA | FRANCE |
| GERMANY | ITALY |
| LUXEMBOURG | NETHERLANDS |
| PORTUGAL | SPAIN |
| TURKEY | UNITED KINGDOM |
| UNITED STATES | |

Figure 4

The development of CTF-PROVIDE COMFORT organizational structure and therefore the command and control (C2) was evolutionary. American Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili was appointed as the commander of CTF-PC. When notified of his new appointment, General Shalikashvili was the Deputy Commander of United States Army Europe (USAREUR). He arrived at the Headquarters at Incirlek, Turkey, on 17 April 1991. General

Jamerson became the Deputy Commander of CTF-PC. Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, was the Chief of staff. General Zinni served as United States European Command's Deputy J3.

| <u>NATIONS PROVIDING SUPPLIES</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| AUSTRALIA | AUSTRIA |
| BELGIUM | BULGARIA |
| CANADA | CZECHOSLOVAKIA |
| DENMARK | FINLAND |
| FRANCE | GERMANY |
| GREECE | HUNGARY |
| ICELAND | IRELAND |
| ISRAEL | ITALY |
| JAPAN | JORDAN |
| LUXEMBOURG | NETHERLANDS |
| NEW ZEALAND | NORWAY |
| PAKISTAN | PORTUGAL |
| ROMANIA | SAUDI ARABIA |
| SPAIN | SWEDEN |
| UNITED KINGDOM | |
| UNITED STATES | |

Figure 5

Thirteen nations joined the military coalition and thirty nations provided humanitarian supplies.²⁵ During April and May these nations deployed air, naval, ground forces and civilian relief organizations in support of OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. The initial staff of CTF-PC was

American. The staff was an ad hoc organization formed by personnel from EUCOM and its component Commands. As other national units joined the coalition, the staff became multinational.

Because an American lieutenant general was the commander of CTF-PC, coalition partners assigned a one or two star general as the commander of their national forces. Coalition partners co-

located their national headquarters with the CTF-PC headquarters at Incirlek Air Base, Turkey. These headquarters reported to respective national governments for all matters on policy and execution for the humanitarian




FIGURE 6

mission. The commander of the national forces had his own staff to handle the administration and logistics required to support his forces deployed on OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. The coalition commander also provided coalition officers to the CTF-PC staff. The assignment of a unit to the subordinate CTF-PC headquarters in the tactical control (TACON) role was a national decision. Tactical control was defined as the local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks

assigned.²⁶ The tactical and humanitarian requirements determine the subordinate CTF-PC headquarters assignment. The coalition governments made the decision on how to use their forces for the operation.

The establishment of CTF-PC and the integration of multinational forces into the coalition took place on 16 April 1991. The AFFOR, NAVFOR and JTF-A, subordinate headquarters under

| COMMAND STRUCTURE EVOLUTION | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>JOINED OPC</u> |
| JTF-PC | 6 APR 91 |
| AFFOR | 6 APR 91 |
| JTF-A | 6 APR 91 |
| NAVFOR | 10 APR 91 |
| CTF-PC | 16 APR 91 |
| COALITION HQS | 16 APR-1 MAY 91 |
| JTF-B | 17 APR 91 |
| MCC | 19 APR 91 |
| CA CMD | 22 APR 91 |
| MED CMD | 28 APR 91 |
| CSC | 1 MAY 91 |

Figure 7

JTF-PC, were transferred to CTF-PC. Both AFFOR and JTF-A had TACON of coalition forces.²⁷ Two additional subordinate headquarters deployed to meet the requirements of OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. Joint Task Force-Encourage Hope, later changed to Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B), was established

on 17 April 1991 to secure a safe haven and resettle the Kurds in northern Iraq. JTF-B was a U.S. joint staff headquarters with TACON of coalition forces under the command of Army Major General Jay M. Garner. This was an ad hoc headquarters formed by personnel from the United States Fifth Corps and subordinate units deployed from Germany.

CTF-PC established the Combined Support Command (CSC) to handle all of the logistical requirements of providing humanitarian and coalition supplies. CSC was established on 1 May 1991 under

the command of Army Brigadier General Harold E. Burch. The staff was an ad hoc organization formed by personnel from the 21st Theater Army Area Command located in Germany. CSC had tactical control over coalition units to execute its mission.²⁸

The Military Coordination Center (MCC) was established in negotiations between General Shalikashvili and Iraqi Major General Saber on 19 April 1991 at the Turkey-Iraqi border customs house. The mission of the MCC was to have daily communications with the Iraqi military and civilian authorities to reduce potential conflicts with the establishment of JTF-B in northern Iraq on 20 April 1991. The first meeting of the MCC was on 21 April 1991 between General Garner and Iraqi Brigadier General Danoun Nashwan in Zakho, Iraq.²⁹

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in Potsdam, East Germany, had little work to do. Therefore, General Galvin deployed the USMLM to Zakho, Iraq, to form the MCC. The MCC negotiated with the Iraqi military and government leaders to resolve incidents ranging from direct coalition/Iraqi confrontations to spraying the wheat crop using Polish contract helicopters in northern Iraq.

The Civil Affairs Command and the Medical Command provided the civil affairs units and medical facilities necessary to resettle the Kurds. These two headquarters coordinated the fifty non-governmental or volunteer agency support for humanitarian assistance.

The United States European Command issued the operation order

to CTF-PC on 16 April 1991 that supported the European leaders' six-point coalition humanitarian program. The operation order had nine military missions to be executed: (1) Identify site locations for temporary shelter out of the mountains. (2) Erect temporary living facilities. (3) Relocate Iraqi (Kurd) displaced civilians to locations supportable by them. (4) Prepare to receive United Kingdom, French and Turkish forces; (5) Establish a Security Zone inside northern Iraq. (6) Prepare to reinforce multinational security forces in Iraq. (6) Prepare to operate unilaterally, maintain, and secure facilities. (7) Provide airborne combat air patrol (CAP) as necessary. (8) Identify additional forces as required. (9) Transfer administration and support functions to civilian organizations.³⁰

The concept of operations for PROVIDE COMFORT was a three-phase operation. Phase One would be air and ground delivery of relief supplies facilitated by Special Forces Teams and establish a CAP beginning on 6 April 1991. Phase Two would include integrating multinational forces, establishing a safe haven in northern Iraq, stabilizing and rebuilding an infrastructure as required, facilitating the movement of displaced persons to new camps, making a transition to multinational civilian organization control, and returning displaced persons to their original homes. Phase Three would remove U.S. and other multinational forces from Iraq and Turkey.³¹ This three-phased operation was to be completed by 15 July 1991 when the last coalition soldiers departed northern Iraq.

III. PERSONAL EXPERIENCES

MY BACKGROUND

As an infantry officer, I have had the normal infantry assignments. I've been fortunate to command infantry companies in Germany, Vietnam and CONUS. I have been a battalion S3 and served twice as a brigade S3. I have served as a division operations officer and division deputy G3. I also was fortunate to command a Bradley battalion for almost three years. I've served as a corps operations officer. I have joint experience as a joint plans officer, joint operations officer, joint exercise officer and deputy J3 of Joint Task Force 11 deployed to Honduras in 1983-84. This background and work experience aided immeasurably in OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT.

HOW DID I END UP IN IRAQ?

When President Bush ordered Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to begin on 5 April 1991, I was serving as the deputy G3 of the United States Fifth Corps (V Corps) stationed at Frankfurt, Germany. At 2100 hours, 16 April 1991, I received a phone call at home from the Deputy Commanding General of V Corps informing me that I was to report to him at Rein Main Air Base flight line at 0700 hrs on 17 Apr 91 for a deployment to eastern Turkey. Major General Jay M. Garner told me to pack cold weather gear for the mountains. He said that he had selected three other V Corps staff officers and me to accompany him to eastern Turkey. We were to make a three day survey to identify what it would take to establish a Joint Task

Force (JTF) in northern Iraq. The JTF was to establish a safe haven in northern Iraq and resettle the displaced Kurds. After the three day survey, we were to return to V Corps and develop the total requirements needed to establish the JTF.

After arriving at the Rein Main flight line with LTC Pat Cavanaugh (Deputy G6), MAJ Ted Kostich (G3 Plans Officer), and MAJ John Cooley (G3 Operations Officer, 2nd COSCOM), we discovered that General Garner had deployed with LTG Shalikashvili by executive jet to Incirlek, Turkey earlier on the morning of 17 Apr 91. LTG Shalikashvili had been designated as the commander of Combined Task Force-Provide Comfort on the 16th of April and was in a hurry to report to his new headquarters at Incirlek Air Base, Turkey. He wanted General Garner to accompany him so the two could discuss issues facing CTF-PC.

After arranging for C-130 aircraft transportation to Incirlek, Turkey to link up with General Garner, the four of us waited in the lounge for our flight to be called. We boarded our flight only to be told the aircraft was broken and had to be repaired. We, therefore, did not depart Frankfurt until oh dark thirty on the 18th of April 1991. We arrived at approximately 0700 hours at Incirlek, Turkey and reported to General Garner.

General Garner, informed us, that there was no time to do the three day survey. The needs of the Kurds were so critical that action had to be taken immediately to stop the dying. We were the staff for a new JTF called Joint Task Force Encourage Hope, later changed to Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B). I was designated as the

J3, and by default the Chief of Staff. LTC Cavanaugh was the J6, MAJ Ted Kostich was the deputy J3 and Maj John Cooley was the Headquarters Commandant/contracting officer and unofficial scrounge. Another officer joined us on 18 Apr 1991. He was U.S. Army MAJ Angelo Santella from SETAF Headquarters in Vicenza, Italy. I made him the plans officer for JTF-B.

INITIAL ACTIONS AS THE J3

General Garner told me that I was to plan for a combat assault into northern Iraq on the 20th of April 1991. After conducting the assault, JTF-B forces were to secure the "safe haven" and start immediately in building a tent city to house the Kurds that were dying in the mountains. The tent city was to house 200,000 displaced Kurdish civilians. He also told me to develop a JTF-B staff organization that would be needed to support the mission. The forces available for the assault were the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24 MEU), commanded by COL Jim Jones. Combat aircraft flying off the carrier USS Teddy Roosevelt (TF-60) stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean and USAF combat aircraft flying from Incirlek, Turkey provided CAS.

He also told me that General Shalikashvili was going to issue a demarche to the Iraqi military to vacate the area that would become the "safe Haven" for the Kurds. This demarche was to be issued at a meeting between General Shalikashvili and Iraqi General Sabar at the customs house located on the Iraqi side of the Turkey/Iraqi border. The demarche stated that all Iraqi military

and secret police forces would vacate an area of thirty kilometers in diameter around the Iraqi town of Zakho effective 0800 hours the morning of 20 April 1991. The thirty kilometer radius was chosen because it would keep Iraqi artillery out of range of Zakho. This would allow U.S. military forces to enter northern Iraq and establish a "safe haven" to resettle the Kurds.

Understanding the verbal guidance from General Garner, I set about analyzing the mission requirements. The mission had two parts. The first part was to establish a security zone in northern Iraq and conduct offensive operations to expand the zone to encompass the Kurdish lands and then defend them from Iraqi military and secret police interference. The second part was to provide humanitarian assistance and resettlement of the Kurds into tent cities or back into their towns and villages. Having no experience in either Turkey or Iraq, I felt that I had to gain as much information as quickly as possible. I went to the C2 of CTF-PC to get whatever he had on the Iraqi military and secret police in northern Iraq. I also visited the C3 of CTF-PC to pick his brain for information about the situation and mission. I also set the other four staff officers on a hunt for information in their specialty area. Neither the C2 or the C3 had any additional information to pass on to me. I did not receive either an operations order or intelligence summary. They were up to their eyeballs in providing airdrop food and supplies to the Kurds in the mountain camps along the Turkish border. We would be conducting the operation with little or no information on how the Iraqi

military would respond to our assault into northern Iraq.

Before departing Frankfurt, Ted Kostick and I raided the V Corps map storage vault and was able to secure two sets of 1:1,000,000 and 1:50,000 maps of eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. These were the only maps available to JTF-B for at least the first ten days of the operation. JTF-B was given an empty room in the CTF-PC headquarters as a work area. It had no tables, chairs, computers, or office equipment. It only had an autovon phone sitting on the floor in the corner of the room. We hung a set of the maps on the wall. After studying the maps, and analyzing what limited information we could collect on the Iraqi military, I called LTC Tom Lynn, the S3 of the 24th MEU.

LTC Lynn and I spoke over the phone, he was at Silopi, Turkey, a good five hour helicopter flight away. His S2 updated me on the situation he had developed through using TF-60's aerial reconnaissance aircraft to fly over northern Iraq. The Teddy Roosevelt was flying daily photo missions over northern Iraq and dropped the actual photos of the area by Navy S2 aircraft to the 24 MEU for photo interpretation. This turned out to be a wealth of information on the Iraqi military positions and equipment, potential air assault landing zones and activities of the local population. It did not tell us of Iraqi intentions if American forces assaulted into northern Iraq.

After gathering all available information, I sat in the corner of the empty office and hand wrote an operations order for the assault into northern Iraq for the 20th of April 1991. I also

| <u>JTF-B OPERATIONS ORDERS</u> | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| <u>ORDERS</u> | <u>DATE</u> | <u>ACTION</u> |
| OPORD 91-1 | 19 APR 91 | Est. Security Zone |
| OPORD 91-2 | 8 MAY 91 | O/O Secure Dihok |
| OPORD 91-3 | 11 MAY 91 | O/O Defend Sector |
| OPORD 91-4 | 13 MAY 91 | O/O Defend Dihok |
| OPORD 91-5 | 17 MAY 91 | Defend In Sector |
| OPORD 91-6 | 6 JUN 91 | Redeploy |

Figure 8

drafted a JTF-B staff and equipment proposal which MG Garner approved with some additions. I then telephoned BG

Harding, V Corps Chief of Staff, and informed him what personnel and equipment was required. V Corps was tasked by European Command through U.S. Army Europe to provide the JTF-B headquarters personnel and equipment. BG Harding would begin to send personnel immediately and the equipment within two weeks. He informed me that both the people and equipment would have to be flowed into the theater by EUCOM. When the full staff arrived, they were from subordinate units of V Corps. Staff training and team building was the order of the day.

The staff also developed a troop list of forces that would be needed to execute the mission. We had operational control (OPCON)

| <u>U.S. TROOP LIST</u> | |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>ARRIVAL DATE</u> |
| JTF-B | 20 Apr 1991 |
| 24 MEU | 20 Apr 1991 |
| 3-325 ABCT | 28 Apr 1991 |
| 18 MP BDE (-) | 28 Apr 1991 |
| 18 ENGR BDE (-) | 30 Apr 1919 |
| 4 BDE, 3 ID | 3 May 1991 |
| 354 CA BDE | 13 May 1991 |

Figure 9

the 24 MEU and were advised that a British Royal Marine brigade would be arriving in eastern Turkey within the next 3-5 days and be under tactical control (TACON) to JTF-B. The 3rd Royal Commando Brigade (3 CDO) was to

arrive with a British Marine infantry battalion, a Dutch Marine infantry battalion, a British Army artillery battalion, an engineer

company and two special engineering detachments for developing blueprints and map reproductions, medical units and support units. CTF-PC had not confirmed that any other national forces would be arriving to support OPC. They had indications that Italy, France and Spain were going to provide units, but had no details on what type of units or when they would arrive.

The mission also required engineer units, aviation assets, military police units, civil affairs units, psychological units,

medical units, signal units, and

support units. We developed a troop list and it was approved by CTF-PC and forwarded to EUCOM for approval. The major

American units received during the operation are listed in Figure 9. JTF-B also received

the coalition units shown in

Figure 10. The arrival of a coalition unit meant that JTF-B had to integrate them into on-going actions and make them a full partner in all JTF-B operations.

COALITION TROOP LIST

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>ARRIVAL DATE</u> |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| 45 CDO BN (UK) | 22 Apr 1991 |
| 1 ACG BN (NL) | 24 Apr 1991 |
| Canadian MED CO | 25 Apr 1991 |
| 3 CDO BDE (-) (UK) | 2 May 1991 |
| French BDE | 5 May 1991 |
| Spanish BDE | 7 May 1991 |
| Italian BDE | 10 May 1991 |
| 29 FA BN (UK) | 15 May 1991 |
| Australia SPT CO | 25 May 1991 |
| Luxembourg PLT | 8 Jun 1991 |

Figure 10

COMBAT OPERATIONS

The operations order (OPORD) tasked the 24 MEU to insert on the morning of 20 April, long range reconnaissance teams and Navy SEAL teams to observe potential landing zones and Iraqi military formations. The 24 MEU was to conduct a three company air assault

into landing zones approximately two kilometers northeast of Zakho, Iraq. The follow-on heavy armored vehicles (Amtracks and LAVs) were to secure the destroyed river bridge across the Turkey/Iraqi border located ten kilometers southwest of Zakho, Iraq. Using organic engineers, they were to repair the bridge and link-up with the air assaulted units northeast of Zakho. The link-up occurred on the 21st of April.

The 24 MEU, using organic engineer assets were to begin immediately building a tent city for the displaced Kurds. This was an extremely important political agenda to show the Kurds and Iraqis that the U.S. was only in northern Iraq to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds, not to continue DESERT STORM.

ARRIVAL IN NORTHERN IRAQ

After arriving at the helicopter landing zone, We established contact with the lead elements and determined that the air assault was uncontested, however, there was at least an Iraqi brigade still occupying Zakho and the surrounding high ground. Before DESERT STORM, Zakho had approximately 50,000 Kurdish people living in the town. All city administration was under Iraqi control, not Kurdish control. The 24 MEU was using a show of force to the Iraqi military units to get them to withdraw from the thirty kilometer security zone around Zakho. The show of force consisted of moving an infantry company supported by Marine Cobra helicopters, Air Force A-10s and Navy A-6s. The procedure was to move the infantry

company within three of four hundred meters of the Iraqi position and establish a defensive position. Next, Navy and Air Force close air support aircraft would make dry runs against the position followed by the appearance of the Marine Cobra helicopters. This would go on for about fifteen or twenty minutes. The commander of the Marine infantry company would make contact through an interpreter with the local Iraqi ground commander and inform him that he had one hour to move his unit from the thirty kilometer security zone.

This was a pretty gutsy maneuver since JTF-B had no information what the Iraqi response would be to American forces moving into northern Iraq. The Iraqi units consisted of a reinforced brigade and occupied the key terrain around Zakho with at least three artillery battalions in direct support. The Iraqis did not have any air support due to the war. The U.S. ground forces consisted of only three Marine infantry companies, and two Cobra helicopters. The 24 MEU composite artillery battery consisted of four 105mm How and four 155mm How airlifted into firing positions northwest of Zakho. The American ground forces were out-numbered. JTF-B used the Iraqi physiological fear of American air power they had gained during OPERATION DESERT STORM to prove to the Iraqi commanders and soldiers that we could destroy their unit if they did not withdraw from the security zone.

General Garner, with his five staff officers and a two man Air Force tactical satellite radio team (TACSAT), established JTF-B headquarters in the 44th Iraqi Division headquarters compound in

Zakho. We moved into the compound and immediately discovered that the compound was occupied by an Iraqi infantry company. We brought in a Marine infantry company with supporting air power and within an hour the Iraqi company withdrew. The 44th Division compound had been an Iraqi show piece headquarters within the Kurdish region. But the Kurdish uprising and the subsequent Iraqi counterattack had trashed the place. Every window and door had been removed. All electrical wiring and fixtures had been removed. The trees were cut down and used by the Kurds to heat and cook when they had occupied the compound. When the Iraqis counterattacked, the Kurds who had been living in the compound fled into the mountains leaving behind all of their possessions. The Iraqi soldiers had scavenged through those belongings and what was not stolen was destroyed and thrown everywhere. Dead animals and human feces were everywhere. Iraqi 44th Division military records were scattered through the compound. The Kurds had destroyed the records during their occupation of the compound.

After cleaning a portion the main building, the JTF-B headquarters was established in northern Iraq. The headquarters of 24 MEU co-located with JTF-B. This was extremely important since JTF-B had no resources of its own and had to use 24 MEU assets. Several Iraqi secret and top secret documents were found on the compound. Since JTF-B had no intelligence officer on its staff at that time, all documents were turned over to the S2 of the 24 MEU. The first situation report (SITREP) was forwarded to CTF-PC via TACSAT. This SITREP informed CTF-PC of the first day success of

JTF-B. The security zone was established, tent city construction underway and Iraqi forces were beginning to withdraw from the thirty kilometer security zone without a shot being fired. The engineer platoon of 24 MEU laid out the first 20,000 personnel tent city and erected the first thirty tents within the first four hours in Iraq. We were all quite proud of our accomplishments that day (Appendix A).

During the 20th of April, MG Garner and I traveled by vehicle into the town of Zakho. We observed a sidewalk Kurdish vendor selling odds and ends. We wanted to see what type of money the vendor would accept. I purchased a shaving mirror and offered the vendor American dollars. He would not take the money. He told me through an interpreter that having U.S. money in his possession would get him arrested and possibly executed due to current Iraqi law. I then tried to offer Turkish Lira, he also refused. He only wanted Iraqi Dinar. This was to pose a serious problem for JTF-B. We knew that JTF-B would have to buy transportation and supplies within northern Iraq to establish the tent cities. The U.S. government and United Nations placed a probation on buying or selling Iraqi currency as an embargo action during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. This meant that to obtain the needed supplies and transportation assets we could not use U.S. money, but had to rely on Iraqi Dinar that we could not buy or convert due to the embargo. This became a serious problem and required both the military and State Department representatives to sort it out. It was sorted out through the U.S. Air Force finance office in Incirlek, Turkey.

They bought Iraqi Dinar, I was told, through black market sources in Turkey.

The second day of the operation saw the repair of the bridge and the link-up of the 24 MEU armored assets. The Iraqi military units had moved out of the 44th Division compound. Iraqi military units had all but moved from the high ground overlooking Zakho. The construction of tent city continued. The first meeting of the Military Coordination Center (MCC) took place between MG Garner and the Iraqi representative, BG Nashwan. We later found out that BG Nashwan was the deputy intelligence officer of the Iraqi General Staff and related to Saddam Hussein. The meeting was a stand-up meeting in the parking lot of the 44th Division headquarters. MG Garner informed BG Nashwan of the locations of Iraqi military units located within the thirty kilometer zone around Zakho. I provided BG Nashwan with a 1:50,000 map of the 30 KM security zone and locations of Iraqi units within the Security Zone. He moved off quickly in his white Mercedes to track down his units and to inform Baghdad of the results of the first MCC meeting. Sometime later, we were able to read the vehicle serial number of BG Nashwan's car and discovered that it had been stolen from a Kuwait City Mercedes dealer. 24 MEU reconnaissance units discovered Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) training camps complete with ranges, obstacle courses, barracks and headquarters buildings. Some PLO records were also discovered and evacuated from Iraq. 24 MEU also established a water processing plant in Zakho on the Zap river and was passing out pure water to the few residents who

chose not to flee into the mountains.

During 21-22 April, the Iraqis had infiltrated 300 secret police into the security zone. The secret police had taken over Zakho and were pressuring the townspeople not to accept assistance from JTF-B. The first sign that something was wrong was that no Kurds went to the 24 MEU water point to get fresh water. The secret police had gone door to door during the night and threaten the Kurdish villagers not contact JTF-B personnel or take any humanitarian assistance. The threat was backed up by force or death. The secret police had searched all houses and looted what items they wanted. The small Kurdish population still living in Zakho began to leave. The Kurds in the mountains would not return since Iraqi secret police were in the town. Their experiences with Iraqi secret police caused an intense fear that could not be overcome by JTF-B good intentions. JTF-B preferred to resettle the displaced Kurds back into their homes in Zakho and not get into establishing even larger tent cities. For every Kurd who we could resettle back into his home was one less that had to live in a tent.

The secret police operating in Zakho was a violation of the demarche that LTG Shalikashvilli had given Iraqi MG Sabar on the 19th of April 1991. This was the first Iraqi test of American resolve in establishing the security zone. Many more Iraqi incidents would occur during OPC (Appendix B). All Iraqi secret police and military units were to deploy out of the 30 KM security zone. JTF-B proceeded to clear the secret police from Zakho.

The first coalition unit to arrive was the British 45 Royal Marine Commando Battalion (45 CDO), part of the 3 CDO Brigade. This battalion had just completed a tour of duty in northern Ireland. They were well trained in operating in urban areas. The second coalition unit to arrive was the 1st Assault Combat Group (1 ACG). This was a Dutch Royal Marine infantry battalion that was part of the British 3 CDO BDE. Both units arrived on 22-24 April 1991 and positioned in Silopi, Turkey.

24 MEU was given TACON of 45 CDO and 1 ACG along with its organic 2nd Battalion 8th Marine battalion landing team (BLT). The mission given to 24 MEU was to find, detain and deport the 300 secret police in Zakho. During phase one of the OPORD (25 April 1991), 45 CDO had the mission to conduct reconnaissance and determined the locations of the secret police. During phase two (26 April 1991), 45 CDO would conduct a house to house search and detain all secret police. The 1 ACG would establish checkpoints/road blocks on all roads into Zakho. They were to deny entry and exit out of Zakho of all personnel. The BLT would control the high ground overlooking Zakho and would provide light armored vehicles (LAVs) to conduct mobile patrols within the city. Phase three was the deportation of the secret police and installation of JTF-B approved police.

The execution of the mission went flawlessly. The coalition of American, British and Dutch Marines worked well and all secret police were apprehended and deported out of the security area. JTF-B then selected and licensed fifty regular Iraqi police

officers for duty in Zakho. The Kurdish people began to return to Zakho. Frequent Kurdish incidents occurred within the security zone (Appendix C). But the 500,000 Kurds in the mountains could not all return to Zakho. Plans were drawn up for the security zone to grow and incorporate other Kurdish towns and villages to aid in the resettlement.

When talking to Kurdish leaders, MG Garner learned that the town of Dihok was home for 300,000 to 400,000 Kurds before DESERT STORM. Dihok was twenty-eight kilometers southeast of Zakho and just inside the Zakho thirty KM security zone. 24 MEU had Navy SEAL and Marine reconnaissance teams on the mountains overlooking Dihok. They reported that the Iraqi military units were evacuating the town as required by the 19 April 1991 demarche. They also reported that the Iraqi soldiers were looting the town and blowing up houses. Therefore, MG Garner thought that Dihok would be key to the resettlement of the bulk of the Kurds in the mountains. We developed an OPORD for the occupation of Dihok. This would allow the coalition to secure Dihok and encourage the people to return to their homes. The Kurds had a very strong fear of the Iraqis. They would not go back into Iraqi controlled areas unless coalition forces removed the Iraqi military and secret police. This plan was never executed due to the fear of Iraqi reactions since Dihok was an Iraqi province capital. The coalition governments were in northern Iraq for humanitarian reasons, not to occupy Iraqi cities or terrain.

Since JTF-B was not allowed to enter Dihok, we turned our

efforts to the east. The procedures used in establishing the 30 KM security zone around Zakho was then used to extent the zone to Batufa, followed by Sirsenk, then Al Amadiyah and finally Suri. This expansion of the coalition security zone required the integration of all coalition partners into a cohesive defensive sector.

More U.S. and coalition forces were arriving every day (Appendix D). At the high point, JTF-B had over 17,000 coalition

| JTF-B COALITION PARTNERS | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| Americans | Dutch |
| Australians | French |
| British | Italians |
| Belgians | Luxembourgers |
| Canadians | Spaniards |

Figure 11

soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen from nine nations deployed in northern Iraq. The nations would arrive as fast as their governments could provide transportation. All of the forces

staged out of Silopi, Turkey before arrival in Northern Iraq.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COALITION SECURITY ZONE

AirLand Battle operations was not the standard doctrine for all coalition partners. This may seem obvious, but cannot be overlooked. Whether the mission is to fight or provide humanitarian assistance, not all coalition units are organized or equipped to support AirLand Battle operations. The American AirLand Battle doctrine not only provides the guidance on how to fight, but it is also provides the basis for equipping the force. Again that is a statement of the obvious, but all coalition militaries are not created equal.

When national military forces deploy in support of coalitions, they also do not have the same capabilities. An infantry unit of one nation may have anti-tank weapons, whereas another nation's infantry platoon may not. Not all units have the same mobility, communications, medical, or high-tech weapons. This inequality can cause problems when integrating coalition nations into a cohesive fighting or humanitarian force.

The JTF-B mission in northern Iraq required the development of a cohesive defense in response to a possible Iraqi attack and to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced Kurds. The commander had to integrate multinational forces to take advantage of unit strengths and offset the limitations. The integration of unit capabilities was a key activity in the coalition building process. The commander of JTF-B considered two options on how to deploy his coalition forces for the defense of the security zone and for humanitarian operations for the Kurds.

The first option was to deploy pure national forces into a national sector within the security zone established inside northern Iraq. Because coalition unit capabilities were not equal, this option did not meet the needs of a cohesive defense or humanitarian assistance requirements. For example, the French parachute brigade, TACON to JTF-B, had no anti-tank weapons or artillery needed for a cohesive defense. They also did not have civil affairs units that could administer a relief assistance program for the Kurds. The French national decision deployed the brigade without its organic anti-tank or artillery assets. This

limited the JTF-B commander's ability in developing national sectors inside northern Iraq.




Figure 12

The second option was to establish sectors within the security zone and provide a command and control headquarters for that sector. The forces provided to the sector commander would be multinational and give that commander the capability to execute

both defensive and humanitarian operations. This allowed the JTF-B commander to integrate the coalition forces and take advantage of the multinational capabilities. This option also allowed for the weaving of a true coalition for both the defensive and humanitarian missions. By integrating coalition units, the commander was able to enhance the unit capabilities of all coalition partners.

In the French example, the French brigade commander had responsibility for a sector within the security zone. He had his own brigade to meet the dual missions of defense and relief assistance. For the humanitarian mission, Spanish and Belgian medical units provided medical coverage for the displaced Kurds in the sector. An American civil affairs battalion aided in the resettlement of the Kurds within the sector. An American military

police unit provided the law enforcement and convoy control requirements.

For the defensive mission, the French commander received both artillery support and anti-tank support by coalition units. The British provided the airmobile ready reaction artillery support within his sector. An American anti-tank element provided the needed tank killing capability. To add an additional tank killing punch if required, an American Apache helicopter battalion was fifteen minutes flying time away. The French commander had extensive close air support provided by the U.S. Air Force from air bases in Turkey and the U.S. Navy flying off an aircraft carrier located in the Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. Marine Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) team provided the capability to call for artillery, close air and attack helicopter support. This ANGLICO team also provided the liaison function for the JTF-B commander. The JTF-B reserve consisting of air assault elements was also available for insertion within his sector. For reconnaissance, the French brigade commander had Italian special forces teams deployed in his sector for early warning of an Iraqi attack. Any coalition unit positioned within the French sector was under the French commander's tactical control.

The building of multinational sectors within the security zone took advantage of all coalition unit capabilities. All multinational sectors were similar to the French example. The multinational sectors were built through the professionalism, personal relationships, and willingness of the military partners to

be team players in obtaining a common goal. This cooperative spirit enhanced and speeded the relief efforts for the displaced Kurdish people. The integration of the unit capabilities allowed the JTF-B commander to weave a totally capable coalition to accomplish his mission. The national commanders received policy guidance from their governments that allowed the building of multinational sectors.

General Garner wanted a common rules of engagement (ROE) to be use by all coalition partners. EUCOM had published a U.S. only rules of engagement (Appendix E). When new nations joined JTF-B, we would issue the EUCOM approved ROE and attempt to get them to accept the ROE so as to have a common ROE throughout JTF-B. But when the national commander submitted the ROE to his government, they were not accepted in total. National governments made modifications to the EUCOM ROE. The staffs and commanders then worked out a locally accepted solution that could be used within JTF-B for all coalition partners.

JTF-B sector was extremely large and a mobile reserve was required. We developed three packages to be used as the situation required. The first package was labeled Sparrow Hawk. It consisted of a reinforced rifle platoon and a TOW section from the American 3rd Battalion 325th Infantry Airborne Combat Team (3-325 ABCT). Airlift was provided by six UH-60 helicopters for the platoon and two CH-47s to sling load the two HUMVEE mounted TOWs. A platoon of AH-64s accompanied the ground element. The second package was called Bald Eagle. It consisted of an U.S. Marine

rifle company lifted by CH-46 helicopters. It also included two AH-64 platoons and Marine cobras. It was a follow-on force if Sparrow Hawk was not capable of handling the situation. The third element of JTF-B reserve was called Flying Guns. It was a British air mobile 105mm How battery. The British provided the air lift to move the battery. The remainder of the AH-64 battalion was also deployed if required.

JTF-B rehearsed Sparrow Hawk daily, and Bald Eagle once a week and Flying Guns once or twice a week. The sector commanders relied on the JTF-B reserve to reinforce the defense of their sector in case of Iraqi offensive operations. The multinational cooperation in employing the reserve aided in weaving the cohesive defensive posture of the coalition.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

JTF-B had two major missions in meeting the humanitarian requirements. The first was to get the Kurds to return to their homes and villages. The second was to provide temporary food and shelter in the tent city if required.

JTF-B had coordinated with JTF-A and arranged for both organizations to use all available transportation assets to move the Kurds down from the mountains. Moving the 452,000 Kurds from mountain camps was not an easy feat. JTF-A and JTF-B contracted for both Turkish and Kurdish trucks to go to the base of the mountains to pick up the people and transport them to either their villages or into the tent cities. The people were not forced to

leave the mountains, they eagerly wanted to go home. Convoy routes and way stations were developed and manned by JTF-A and JTF-B personnel. It took over two weeks to get all of the Kurds off the mountain tops.

KURDISH TOWNS AND VILLAGES

JTF-B executed the first part of the humanitarian mission through establishing security in an area. Then we would move military and civilian resources into the towns and villages to conduct a survey of what was needed to put them back in order. This survey was key in deciding what kind of resources would have to be provided. After the survey, the JTF-B staff would then task subordinate units to make the necessary repairs.

Some repairs took a major effort from JTF-B subordinate units. The engineers would repair generators to run emergency electricity for water pumps, lighting and basic sanitation systems. The engineers had to repair roads, clear rubble from the streets, and clear the towns of extensive munitions. At one point JTF-B had over fifteen explosive ordnance teams (EOD) consisting of over fifty personnel to clear Kurdish and coalition areas. This exceeded our wildest expectations. Both the Iraqi military and Kurdish freedom fighters had left all sorts of munitions. Houses were booby trapped, mines, grenades, artillery and mortar shells were everywhere. EOD personnel conducted a controlled detonation of over five tons of ordnance every day at 1200 hours. The engineers were also responsible for building the necessary items

for the tent cities. Ninety percent of the engineer work effort went to supporting the humanitarian mission. The remaining ten percent went to supporting coalition units in preparing defensive and local security construction. A Navy SEABEE platoon and Army engineer platoon repaired fourteen bomb craters in the Sirsenk airfield. This was the only coalition C-130 capable airfield in northern Iraq.

Medical units reestablish health clinics and restocked the supplies in over ten medical facilities. Since most of the doctors had fled, JTF-B had to man the clinics with military doctors or arrange for a private volunteer organization to staff the clinics. Sanitation checks and veterinarian services were also provided. In one medical hospital, two Iraqi doctors stayed but had not received their salaries from the Baghdad government. JTF-B arranged for a civilian organization to pay the salaries of the two doctors just to keep them working in the facility. JTF-B also coordinated through BG Nashwan for the Iraqi government to pay the doctors' back pay and current salary. This was accomplished through pointing out to BG Nashwan that his government's stated policy was to care for the Kurds. The Iraqis were quite sensitive to the fact that the world had turned out to help the Kurds since Iraq was not going to help them.

JTF-B medical units gave over 50,000 measles shots to the Kurdish children living in the security zone. Coalition units provided six fully staffed surgical hospitals to support the Kurds and coalition forces. It became a standard phrase, that the

medical coverage provided by the coalition to the Kurds was the best anywhere in the world. There was so many medical units and hospitals that I ran out of places for their employment. Every coalition government wanted their hospital to support the Kurds no matter how many medical facilities were already in northern Iraq. One serious problem was that there was not enough ground ambulances for the mission. Only two MEDEVAC helicopters were available. So many MEDEVAC missions were flown by standard helicopters.

Major John Cooley set up a Kurdish trucking company to help in transporting humanitarian supplies. He started with two trucks. After the word got out that JTF-B was hiring trucks for \$15.00 a day, a bottle of water and MRE for the driver and diesel fuel to complete the mission, he had over 200 trucks showing up each morning for work. At the trucking office, JTF-B had a terrible traffic problem and the military police were charged with sorting it out. JTF-B established two daily convoys through out the security zone to five major distribution points delivering water, food, fuel, building supplies and other commodities.

Civil affairs units conducted surveys to find all sorts of information on the Kurdish standard of living. Before OPC, the Iraqi government had preselected grocery stores for Kurdish citizens to shop at for food and other essentials. The system had broken down since the Kurdish uprising. CA personnel discovered, through Kurdish citizens, that Kurds could only shop at the grocery store assigned to them. The Iraqi store manager had a customer list of Kurds who could shop at that particular store. The Iraqi

government did this to distribute the required food stuffs throughout the Kurdish region since they did not have a free market economy. When the Kurds returned to their towns, JTF-B tapped into this system and was able to decide how much bulk food was required to support the people. This helped greatly in transportation and getting the right amount of food at the right place.

TENT CITIES

Civil Affairs personnel also ran three tent cities in Zakho, two in Sirsenk and the planned tent city in Suri. They became the mayor, utilities and sanitation department, water department, fire department, police department and food distribution workers in the tent cities. They ran all of the infrastructure for a 20,000 person city.

The establishment of the tent city was a large task. JTF-B planned on housing 200,000 Kurdish refugees in tent cities. We surveyed the Zakho valley floor and laid out ten 20,000 camp sites. The valley floor was planted with wheat before the Kurdish uprising. Northern Iraq produces the countries only wheat crop. The harvesting of this wheat crop became a JTF-B humanitarian mission later in the operation. The lay out of the camps, construction of roads, installation of water distribution systems, food distribution systems, medical and limited dental facilities, safety, law enforcement, and turn them over to the United Nations was top priority to stop the dying of the Kurds in the snow covered mountains. Figure 13 shows the resources needed for the

establishment of one 20,000 personnel tent city. Ten such camps were planned in the Zakho valley.

The resources required to support the planned ten tent cities

was massive. The personnel needed to staff the tent cities would require a Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade, State Department personnel (DART), United Nations personnel and resources, private volunteer organizations and non-governmental organizations

| <u>TENT CITY REQUIREMENTS</u> | |
|---|-----------------|
| <u>RESOURCES</u> | <u>QUANTITY</u> |
| Tents | 4,000 |
| Latrines | 960 |
| Roads | 6 Miles |
| Water Supply | 100,000 Gal |
| Water Storage | 66,000 Gal |
| Food Storage | 1 Pole Shed |
| Security Lighting | 1 Set |
| Total completion time for city of 20,000 is 17 days | |

Figure 13

(PVO/NGO). During the operation, the reserve 354th Civil Affairs Brigade with three reserve CA battalions and one active duty CA battalion worked the resettlement of the Kurds. The CA units operated the camps even after the camps were turned over to the United Nations. The UN did not provide the personnel to adequately man the tent cities. The UN flag flew over the tent cities, but coalition forces provided all services. The UN did quickly get into providing food through CARE and transported the food from ports in Turkey. They took control of the food warehouses around 15 May. The UN personnel had liaison with JTF-B but did not want the Iraqis to view them as members of the coalition. They kept their distance to assure the Iraqi government that they were neutral. They were very helpful in providing advice to the JTF-B commander and staff.

DIHOK HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

JTF-B TENT CITIES

- * 10 Tent cities in Zakho
 - ** For 200,000 Kurds
 - ** 2 Tent cities complete
 - ** Third complete except for tents
 - ** Tent city 4/5 Roads complete
 - ** Tent city 6/7 surveyed
- * 2 Tent cities in Sirsenk
 - ** 1 Tent city complete
 - ** Second complete except for tents
- * 1 Tent city in Suri
 - ** Surveyed only

Figure 14

An agreement was reached with the Iraqi government in late May that would allow eighty-one military personnel and eighty-one civilian personnel to enter Dihok and reestablish, along with Iraqi officials, the basic health services in the city. The JTF-B military and civilian personnel

were only allowed to stay for twenty-one days in this effort. This allowed more Kurds to return to their homes in Dihok and greatly reduced the number of refugees staying in the tent camps around Zakho. This action of putting Dihok back into service virtually cleared the tent cities. Only those Kurds, who lived outside the security zone, were afraid to return to their villages.

PRESS SUPPORT

The world press descended on JTF-B beginning on 20 April 1991. General Garner wanted the press to have free access to the coalition forces and to their activities in support of the Kurds. Over fifty press personnel with cameras and equipment wanted to enter northern Iraq to witness the humanitarian operations. The Turkish government initially would not let them cross the border into Iraq. General Garner directed that helicopters be made

available to fly them across the border to the security zone to observe and report. The staff set up twice a day CH-47 flights from Silopi, Turkey to Zakho Iraq. Once the press were on the ground, they were provided transportation to travel anywhere in the security zone. This air and ground transportation for the press had top priority after delivering lifesaving supplies. Even limited communication facilities were made available to the world press to get their stories out of northern Iraq. MG Garner's total support to the press paid big dividends in the success of OPC.

PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS/NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Another aspect of multinational integration of capabilities and resources occurred with the fifty private volunteer organizations (PVO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO). They are what I would call disaster groupies. They have covered the world's disasters for the past twenty plus years. There is not a disaster war story they cannot tell. These organizations provided an outstanding level of expertise and capability in humanitarian relief and assistance for the Combined Task Force-PROVIDE COMFORT. There was, initially, no command and control structure in charge that could organize the PVO/NGO's. These organizations, in some instances, arrived in the mountain camps along the Turkish border before coalition military forces arrived. Most of them have provided relief care for many disasters throughout the world. Their vast experience in providing relief to people in disasters far exceeded the experience of the coalition military commanders.

The CTF-PC coalition command and control structure accommodated the fifty relief organizations deployed in Turkey and

PVO/NGO AGENCIES

ACTION NORD-SVD
ADVENTIST AGENCY
AMERICAN FRIENDS
AMERICAN RED CROSS
AMERICAN REFUGEE CTE
AMHURT
CARE
CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICE
CHRISTIAN OUTREACH
CONCERN
DANISH CHURCH AID
DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS
DOCTORS OF THE WORLD
EQUILIBRE
GERMAN BERGWACHT
GERMAN RED CROSS
GLOBAL PARTNERS
HELO MISSION
HULP AAN KUTERDAN
INTL ACTION AGAINST HUNGER
INTL CTE OF THE RED CROSS
INTL MEDICAL CORPS
INTL REFUGEE YEAR TRUST
INTL RESCUE CTE
IRISH CONCERN
ITALIAN RED CROSS

Figure 15

northern Iraq. The CTF-PC found a humanitarian need and then worked with the relief agencies to identify a PVO/NGO that could provide the required support. The task of dealing with the PVO/NGO's was monumental due to the sheer numbers of the different agencies. All of the agencies expected and received the full cooperation and support of the coalition. The Civil Affairs Brigade sorted out the humanitarian needs and coordinated with the PVO/NGO's to find an agency who would provide the support. The coalition provided

the command, control and communications needed for the PVO/NGO's. The military coalition provided or coordinated nearly all of the transportation requirements for the civilian relief organizations. The relief agencies required some logistical and communication support from the coalition, but generally were self-sustaining.

The military coalition was able to use its strengths of command and control, intelligence gathering, organization,

PVO/NGO AGENCIES (CONT)

JAPAN SOTOSHU RELIEF CTE
MALTESE HILFS DEINST
MEDICAL VOLUNTEERS INTL
MIDWEST COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
OPERATION MERCY
OXFAM
RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT
RED CROSS OF MALTA
SAMARITANS PULSE
SAVE THE CHILDREN
SWEDISH NAT'L RESCUE BOARD
SWEDISH RESCUE SERVICE
SWISS CHARITY TEAM
SWISS MISSION
SWISS PROJECT OF EMER HELP
TEAR FUND (UK)
TURKISH RED CRESCENT
UNITED NATIONS
UNICEF
WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
WORLD FOOD PROGRAM
WORLD RELIEF INTL
WORLD VISION RELIEF & DEVP
WORLD VISION, AUSTRALIA

communications, and transportation in the integration process of finding a humanitarian need and applying the necessary non-governmental or private volunteer organization to that need. The coalition military partners and the civilian relief agencies integrated their capabilities and enhanced the humanitarian relief provided to the Kurds.

Figure 16

IV. CONCLUSION

THE MISSION WAS ACCOMPLISHED

Joint Task Force Bravo completed its mission of sustaining the lives of over one million displaced Kurdish people in northern Iraq in 100 days. During the 100 days the world poured out its generosity and humanity toward the Kurds. The accomplishments of JTF-B proved that a military coalition is an extremely effective organization in providing humanitarian assistance and security. The fast action lifesaving has set a model for coalition and

civilian relief agencies in future humanitarian operations.

HUMANITARIAN HIGH POINTS

- * Secured 21,000 SQ KM of Iraq
- * Housed 68,000 in tent cities
- * Treated 31,000 patients
- * Provided 3.5 MIL MRE's
- * Provided 10,000 LBS of clothing
- * Transported 2.38 MIL GAL of water
- * Provided 15 ST of bulk food
- * Established/fixed power, water and medical facilities in Zakho, Dihok, Batufa, Sirsenk, Al Amadiyah and Suri
- * Cleared 2.7 MIL LBS of ordnance
- * Provided 10,000 ST of building materials
- * Moved 430,000 Kurds from mountains

Figure 17

The building of a military coalition requires trust and mutual respect in the personal relationships of the coalition partners. The

political agendas and the mission requirements must be accommodated within the coalition. Coalition humanitarian operations should include the development of memoranda of understandings between military partners. The development of MOUs between coalition members could go a long way to further mutual understanding.

The use of tactical control (TACON) as a method for employing coalition forces will be the standard into the 21st century. Coalition nations will maintain control of their forces deployed on the battlefield. The coalition commander must work with TACON relationships and still accomplish his mission.

The rules of engagement are a critical part of any military coalition. They need to pass the common sense test among all members of the coalition. One way for them to be common for all members is for governments to develop and agree on the ROE before deployment on an operation. Common ROE makes a seamless coalition.

Integrating unit capabilities will always be required when national military forces deploy on an operation. All coalition forces are not equipped or organized in the same fashion as the United States. The vast capabilities of the American armed forces should be used to fill the voids that may exist in a coalition. Whether the U.S. is the leader of the coalition or a member, the capabilities that currently exist in our military will carry any coalition on any mission into the 21st century.

When combined with private volunteer and non-governmental organizations, the multinational coalition develops a synergism that can accomplish any mission assigned. Work must be done by our civil affairs units to understand, organize and operate with PVO/NGO's. The State Department, through the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), possess some capability to sort through the PVO/NGO situation. The proliferation of these humanitarian organizations can quickly overwhelm an organization unless a commander is prepared to deal with them. DART and civil affairs units are the best ones to interact with them. The PVO/NGO organizations are fearless and will deploy into any battlefield or situation to provide humanitarian assistance. Opportunities to practice coalition humanitarian operations will arise.

APPENDIX A

WHAT JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO ACCOMPLISHED

| | |
|---|---------------|
| Deployed JTF-B to Zakho, Iraq. | 20 April 1991 |
| Commenced construction of tent city #1. | 20 April 1991 |
| Patrols and checkpoints established in Zakho. | 26 April 1991 |
| Secret police leave Zakho. | 26 April 1991 |
| First Kurds in tent city. | 27 April 1991 |
| UN presence established at tent city #1. | 27 April 1991 |
| Batufa secured. | 27 April 1991 |
| Sirsenk secured. | 2 May 1991 |
| Al Amadiyah secured. | 3 May 1991 |
| Derlock/Suri secured. | 6 May 1991 |
| Tent City #1 complete/Tent City #2 open. | 11 May 1991 |
| UN flag raised at Tent city #1. | 13 May 1991 |
| Sirsenk airfield opened. | 15 May 1991 |
| Dihok assessment team deployed. | 20 May 1991 |
| Coalition Humanitarian operations commenced in Dihok. | 24 May 1991 |
| Transferred responsibility for tent city #1 to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). | 27 May 1991 |
| Transferred responsibility for tent city #2 to UNHCR. | 3 June 1991 |
| Commenced redeployment operations. | 8 June 1991 |
| Dihok operations complete. | 15 June 1991 |
| Redeployment operations halted. | 22 June 1991 |
| Redeployment operations restarted. | 12 July 1991 |
| Resettled 500,000 Kurds. | 15 July 1991 |
| JTF-B mission complete. | 15 July 1991 |
| New JTF from Turkey provides overwatch of security zone in northern Iraq. | 15 July 1991 |

APPENDIX B

INCIDENTS BY IRAQIS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE

| | |
|---|---------------|
| Civilian vehicle in security zone ambushed. | 23 APRIL 1991 |
| Two Kurds executed in Batufa. | 24 April 1991 |
| Grenade attack against Kurds. | 27 April 1991 |
| Iraqi soldiers murder four women in Batufa. | 28 APRIL 1991 |
| Iraqis fire twice on A6 aircraft. | 7 May 1991 |
| Iraqis fire on MEDEVAC helicopter. | 9 May 1991 |
| Four separate incidents of Iraqi personnel firing on British soldiers. | 13 May 1991 |
| Iraqis fire on OH-58 helicopter. | 14 May 1991 |
| Iraqis fire on AH-64 helicopter. | 17 May 1991 |
| Iraqis fire into Kurdish demonstration killing five and wounding three. | 2 June 1991 |
| Iraqis fire on F-16. | 16 June 1991 |
| Iraqis fire on two F-16s and two A6 aircraft. | 21 June 1991 |
| Iraqis exchange gunfire with Kurds vicinity of Saddam Hussein's Summer Palace within the security zone. | 27 June 1991 |
| Iraqi guards moving between palace grounds in violation of agreement. | 1 July 1991 |
| Iraqi military intelligence agents stopped, shots fired, three time bombs found in car. | 5 July 1991 |
| Iraqi army build-up south of Dihok outside of the security zone. | 9 July 1991 |

APPENDIX C

INCIDENTS BY KURDS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE

| | |
|--|---------------|
| Kurdish checkpoint established within the security zone. | 26 April 1991 |
| Grenade attack against the Zakho police station. | 28 April 1991 |
| Demonstration at tent city #1 ends with riot at police station. | 13 May 1991 |
| Crowd attacks BG Nashwan, driver and Baghdad reporter. | 21 May 1991 |
| Kurds demonstrate in Dihok and attack police chief. | 25 May 1991 |
| Kurd Communist Party abducts police in Mangesh. | 27 May 1991 |
| U.S. Marine patrol fired on twice by Kurds. | 29 May 1991 |
| Kurds retaliate for Iraqi attack against demonstrators in Dihok killing two and wounding four. | 2 June 1991 |
| French patrol caught in firefight between Kurdish factions. | 17 June 1991 |
| Kurds attack Iraqi guards at Ashawa palace wounding three. | 22 June 1991 |
| Kurds stop Turkish resupply truck for ransom. | 26 June 1991 |
| Kurds attack Iraqi palace guards at Summer Palace. | 27 June 1991 |
| Kurds stone Iraqi guard bus in Zsawita. | 3 July 1991 |
| U.S. AH-64's fired on by PKK faction in Silopi, Turkey. | 6 July 1991 |
| Armed Peshmerga escort Italian patrol out of village. | 9 July 1991 |
| Peaceful Kurdish pro-coalition demonstrations at border crossing and JTF-B headquarters. | 15 July 1991 |

APPENDIX D

JTF-B COALITION TASK ORGANIZATION

JTF-B

TM, 1st Comm SQD (USAF)
TM, Joint Comm SPT ELM (JCS)
CO, 7th SIG BDE (-) (USA)
PSYOPS CO, 4 PSYOPS BDE (USA)
ANGLICO CO (USMC)

24 MEU (USMC)

BLT, 2/8 Marines (-) (USMC)
264 HMM (USMC)
24 MMSG (USMC)
3-325 ABCT (-) (USA)
3 TMs, Special Forces (IT)
SEAL DET, NSWDC (USN)
79 BTRY (UK)
CO, 433 CA BN (USA)
RPV DET, (USMC)

3 CDO BDE (UK)

45 CDO BN (UK)
29 RA BN (UK)
1 ACG BN (NL)
CO, PTL (UK)
AVN BN (UK)
59 ENGR CO (UK)
LOG BN (UK)
LOG CO (AUS)
96 CA BN (-) (USA)

FRENCH BRIGADE (FR)

Para BN (FR)
E, 2/8 Marines (USMC)
INF SEC, 3 CDO (UK)
ENGR SEC, 3 CDO (UK)
INF PLT (SP)
Hospital (BE)
Hospital (SP)
PLT, Special Forces (IT)
LOG BN (FR)
CO, 96 CA BN (USA)

SPANISH BRIGADE (SP)

ABN BN (SP)
HELO SEC (SP)
ENGR PLT (SP)
SIG PLT (SP)
MED PLT (SP)
SPT PLT (SP)

ITALIAN BDE (IT)

5th ABN BN (IT)
9th SF CO (-) (IT)
LOG BN (IT)
Hospital (IT)
A, 3-325 ABCT (USA)
CO, 431 CA BN (USA)

18 EN BDE (USA)

94 EN BE (USA)
133 NMCB (USN)
11 EN BN (NL)
51 EN CO (UK)
6 FLD SERV (UK)
524 STRE (UK)
39 EOD FLT (USAF)
EOD DET (USA)
EOD DET (NL)

18 MP BDE (-) (USA)

709 MP BN (-) (USA)
284 MP CO (USA)
527 MP CO (-) (USA)

4th BDE, 3ID (USA)

AH-64 BN (USA)
UH-60/CH-47 BN (USA)
AVIM CO (USA)
JTF-B Reserve
Sparrow Hawk
Bald Eagle
Flying Guns

354 CA BDE (USA)

431 CA BN (-) (USA)
418 CA BN (USA)
433 CA BN (-) (USA)
Hospital (FR)

APPENDIX E

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

As Authorized by JCS (EUCOM Dir. 55-47)

1. All military operations will be conducted in accordance with the Law of War.

2. The use of armed force will be utilized as a measure of last resort only.

3. Nothing in these rules negates or otherwise over-rides a commander's obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for his units self-defense.

4. U.S. forces will not fire unless fired upon, unless there is clear evidence of hostile intent.

HOSTILE INTENT - The threat of imminent use of force by an Iraqi force, or other foreign force, terrorist group, or individuals against the U.S., U.S. forces, U.S. citizens, or Kurdish or other refugees located above the 36th parallel or otherwise located within a U.S. or allied safe haven refugee area. When the on-scene commander determines, based on convincing evidence, that HOSTILE INTENT is present, the right exists to use proportional force to deter or to neutralize the threat.

HOSTILE ACT - Included armed force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. or allied forces.

5. Response to hostile fire directly threatening U.S. or allied care shall be rapid and directed at the source of hostile fire, using only that force necessary and proportional to eliminate the threat. Other foreign forces (such as reconnaissance aircraft) that have shown an active integration with the attacking force may be engaged. Use minimum amount of force necessary to control the situation.

6. You may fire into Iraqi territory in response to hostile fire.

7. You may fire into another nation's territory in response to hostile fire only if the cognizant government is unable or unwilling to stop that force's hostile acts effectively and promptly.

8. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel.

9. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft south of the 36th parallel only when they demonstrate hostile or commit a hostile act. Except in cases of self-defense, authority for such engagement rests with the designated air defense commander. Warning bursts may be fired ahead of foreign aircraft to deter hostile acts.

10. In the event U.S. forces are attacked or threatened by UNARMED hostile elements, mobs, or rioters, the responsibility for the protection of U.S. forces rests with the U.S. commanding officer. On scene commander will employ the following to overcome the threat.

- a. Warnings to demonstrators.
- b. Show of force, including use of riot control formations.
- c. Warning shots fired over the heads of hostile elements.
- d. Other reasonable uses of force necessary under circumstances and proportional to the threat.

11. Use the following guidelines when applying these rules:

- a. Use of force only to protect lives.
- b. Use of minimum force necessary.
- c. Pursuit will not be taken to retaliate, however, immediate pursuit may begin and continue for as long as there is an imminent threat to U.S. forces. In the absence of JCS approval, U.S. forces should not pursue any hostile force into another nation's territory.
- d. If necessary and proportional, use all available weapons to deter, neutralize, or destroy threat as required.

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